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Post-Traumatic Memory Projects: Autobiographical Fiction and 
Counter-monuments 
 ‘ Perhaps – I am just asking- perhaps literature, in the company of the ‘I’ which 
has forgotten itself, travels the same path as art, toward that which is mysterious 
and alien.  […] I know, there are other, shorter paths. But after all, literature, 
too, often shoots ahead of us.’  Paul Celan, The Meridian 1 
 
In the essay ‘Virtual Commemoration: The Iraqi Memorial Project’, Joseph 
DeLappe and David Simpson reflect on the nature of public monuments 
commemorating historical trauma and what they term ‘counter-monumental 
gestures.’ They compare the ‘alternative memorialisation’  of ‘virtual monuments,’ 
such as are continually updated online at iraqimemorial.org, as against 
traditional, static monuments that ‘regurgitate the grandiose gestures of a 
vengeful patriotism that insists on claiming that death is somehow worthwhile.’ 
Traditional monuments, they argue, require ‘money and above all peacetime’ and 
in Iraq ‘even living memory is insecure.’ When memorials are constructed, 
DeLappe and Simpson ask ‘Who is remembered? Who is mourned? Who is 
responsible for remembering and mourning, and how can artists respond?’ 2  In 
Leigh Gilmore’s work on autobiographical fiction that has its roots in traumatic 
experience, she uses a similar terminology of public commemoration: an 
autobiography, she argues ‘is a monument to the idea of personhood, to the 
notion that one could leave behind a memorial to oneself.’ 3 What precisely, one 
might ask, is the difference between lived events that may or may not be 
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remembered by us or others, and a textual monument to our ‘personhood,’ 
framed as a memorial to oneself? Is one ‘truer’ than another, or are they simply 
different sites through which to explore the relations between trauma, 
knowledge, power and meaning?   
These inquiries bring to mind the four questions Michel Foucault presents 
as central to any examination of truth telling: ‘who is able to tell the truth, about 
what, with what consequences, and with what relation to power?’4 Whether we 
are considering building monuments, conceiving virtual memorials or writing 
textual responses to the past, these questions remind us of the complexities of 
and pressures upon both truth and telling everywhere it occurs. Moreover, these 
pressures are nowhere more troubling, frustrating and contested than where 
tales of trauma attempt to be told.  As Shoshana Felman has noted, 
contemporary history is ‘crystallized around these two poles: the trial (law and 
justice) on the one hand, and trauma, […] on the other hand.’ 5  In this bi-polar 
world, the longing for justice through speech increases as does the insecurity of 
the very category through which such justice might be achieved: memory.  
As Andreas Huyssen argues, struggles ‘over public memory involving 
historical trauma, genocide, human rights violations and their aftereffects abound 
in the world today. Monuments, memorials, public sculptures, commemorative 
sites, and museums are being created at an accelerated pace the world over.’ 
Nevertheless, he notes, ‘public memory  […] cannot be stored forever nor can it 
be secured by monuments.’ 6 Or, in the words of Robert Musil, ‘there is nothing 
as invisible as a monument.’7 While once we might have believed that 
monuments memorialized heroes and autobiographies recounted generally 
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truthful lives of the great, in our age the categories of memory, monumentality, 
and truth telling are all far from stable.  
In this essay, I will argue that this contingency has not only come to 
supersaturate concrete and textual representations of traumatic experience, but 
also, to link the discourses with which these very different kinds of renderings 
are discussed and debated.  As Gilmore puts it, they have the ‘potential to 
reorganize what justice and knowledge look like in the context of trauma.’8 The 
seemingly distinct memory projects manifested in, for example, war memorials, 
autobiographical literature, legal testimony and the speech of victims of post-
traumatic stress disorders, have, I suggest, developed against and alongside a 
common set of problematic conceptual, linguistic and socio/political principles. 
The result of this process is that each of these projects similarly map out and 
produce idiosyncratic representations of the nature of these boundaries, the 
genre-blurring and interdisciplinary character of which my own argument echoes.  
Legacies of Self-Representation 
Two strange things happened on the day I first sat down to think about 
this essay.  I received an email from a friend of mine, a well-known writer who is 
publishing a memoir. In it, she said, is ‘a little mention of you, or part of you 
mixed with a couple of other people, so I just wanted you to run your eye over 
it.’ A few years back, this same friend had published a novel in which I thought I 
recognized myself. The character was a lecturer, teaching the poems of Hart 
Crane, and a struggling single mother (all of which I was at the time),  
flamboyantly dressed, dramatic and heavy-set.  I don’t recognize myself in these 
last three characteristics—but who is to say how we appear to others?  Well, 
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actually, the writer is the one to say.  Saying how she sees is how she earns a 
living.  That character, my friend assured me, was an amalgam of me and 
several other people and things she made up.  Nevertheless I was wary about 
the memoir. But read it I did. And there, in two beautifully crafted paragraphs 
were distilled the history of my divorce, my struggles, and my recent remarriage.   
My (new) husband saw me crying at my desk and said ‘what’s wrong?’  I pointed 
to the screen.  He read too.  ‘Is this true?’ I asked him.  ‘Is this how it was?’ ‘It is 
part of the truth’ he said.  ‘It is R’s view—her truth about your life.’  Of course he 
was right. ‘So why am I crying?’ I asked.   
A few hours later a police officer was taking a witness statement from 
me.  I have witnessed two robberies recently near my house, and the officer 
wants to  write down everything I saw ‘in my own words.’ He says this several 
times ‘in your own words’ but he is filling in the form long before I have said 
anything and using language I would never use.  ‘I had a clear and unobstructed 
view from my window.  The male I will call ‘Male A’ proceeded to break down the 
door with a large mallet while another male, ‘Male B’ revved the engine of a 
waiting motorcycle.  I was approximately 15 to 20 feet from Male A when he 
entered the premises, etc.’  At the beginning of the interview I am anxious—how 
can I sign an affirmation that these are ‘my words?’ Will the case fall apart if I do 
not?  I don’t want those criminals coming back. And I don’t remember all the 
details.  What the colour of their clothes were, what kind of motorcycle it was—
were they tall or short? I tell the policeman this, and tell him how scared I was.  
That I was once the victim of a violent crime and that I shake at loud noises.  
The statement he reads back to me at the end of the hour says none of these 
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things.  Nevertheless, I am comfortable with signing it off as an accurate account 
of what I saw.  I compliment the officer on his eye for detail.  ‘I guess I have 
written enough of these things by now,’ he says.  I approve both versions of my 
life story, one for my friend’s memoir and one for the police officer. As he drives 
off, I think about the legacy of my testimony, but also the legacy of my life story, 
as told by friend and in my own works of autobiographical fiction. 
In addition to the self who has appeared in the work of others, I also 
write autobiographical fiction. Much of this work, is, moreover informed by (I 
could say ‘haunted by’) a series of traumatic childhood events.  This is, as 
Gilmore’s work explores, no coincidence. Many writers of autobiographical works 
that push at the boundaries of truth and fiction, have suffered trauma in 
childhood.  The works Gilmore examines (Dorothy Allison’s Bastard out of 
Carolina; Mikal Gilmore’s Shot in the Heart; the serial autobiographies of Jamaica 
Kincaid and Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body) develop alongside an 
aesthetic of trauma that Gilmore terms the ‘limits of autobiography.’  This 
aesthetic troubles borderlines, blurs agency, and like the multiple textual 
representations of me in which I colluded, offers alternative contexts through 
which to interrogate the traumatic self.   
The Aesthetics of Trauma 
The multiple pressures upon the representation of traumatic experience 
whether in autobiographical fictions or in commemorative artwork, suggest we 
may need an alternative aesthetics for interpreting such projects. In answer to 
this requirement, the historian Saul Friedlander calls for an ‘aesthetics that 
remarks on its own limitations, its inability to provide external answers and stable 
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meaning […] that devotes itself primarily to the dilemmas of representation.’  It 
is this very aesthetic that appears to be at work in much post-traumatic 
autobiographical fiction. Such texts are precisely the exploration of limitations—
as the post-traumatic writer, compelled to testify to the past, is unwilling to write 
purely imaginative fiction but equally unable to write a memoir that might 
suggest, the possibility of ‘external answers and stable meaning.’ The result is a 
narrative ‘primarily’ concerned with ‘the dilemmas of representation,’ often 
fragmentary and intertextual in character.9 Friedlander suggests, moreover, that 
the reason for such a strategy is that it ‘sustains uncertainty’—enabling the writer 
to continue writing for a lifetime—and also ‘allows’ the writer to ‘live without full 
understanding.’ 10  
As recent research into post-traumatic stress suggests, such an aesthetic 
is particularly suited those who suffer from the disorder (knowingly or 
otherwise): PTSD, it seems, has a particular effect upon its victims’ relationship 
to language and meaning. Psychoanalyst and critic Juliet Mitchell calls this effect 
‘the pseudosymbolic language of post-trauma.’ As Mitchell has argued, in post-
trauma ‘words are pseudosymbolic, plagiaristic imitations or metaphors […] 
expressions of feeling rather than of meaning.’ 11 The post-traumatic writer, 
therefore, may be attracted to autobiographical fiction as a form of life-story 
telling that allows them to express feelings without being forced to attribute 
meaning to them and also engages the ‘dilemma of representation’ that mimics 
their psychic state. In order to understand how this alteration in language and 
meaning occurs in post-trauma, it will be useful to turn to the chemistry of 
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memory to examine how sensory experiences, and the words and memories to 
which they give rise, are processed in non-traumatic encounters. 
Memories are produced by a complex multiple system in which both 
sensory and semantic perceptions are processed in different areas of the brain 
and then stored.12 In the first instance, they are either stored as declarative 
‘episodic memories’—those specific events that we can remember clearly—or as 
‘general knowledge’ or ‘semantic content’ only—for instance when we remember 
our times tables without remembering all the particular moments in which we 
memorized them.13  We cannot hold on to all of our episodic memories, 
however—there isn’t enough space. So in sleep, our hippocampus floods with 
hormones that enable it to sort through them, deciding what to keep intact and 
what to distill into general knowledge. Thus, one of the things that happens 
when we dream is a sifting through of sensory perceptions removed from their 
semantic, general knowledge-based contexts.14  This is why in dreams we can 
see, for example, our mothers and our school chums and movie stars all side by 
side, or why our house may float and we may fly.  All the normal contexts have 
been put aside and new rule-breaking combinations are possible.  As clinical 
psychologist Robert Strickgold explains ‘at its most complex, the integration of 
disparate memories leads to artistic and scientific creativity—the associating of 
objects and concepts in new, unexpected, but meaningful patterns.’ 15  In normal 
memory functioning, that is, imagination is possible.  Meaning itself is derived 
from this normal integration process of sensory perceptions into memory. But 
what happens to such memories in trauma and post-trauma? 
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As Strickgold explains, PTSD is at its core, ‘a consequence of failed 
memory processing, characterized in part by the […] inappropriate dominance of 
specific episodic memories of traumatic events.’   PTSD occurs, he says:  
when the brain fails to appropriately consolidate and integrate the 
episodic memory into the semantic memory system, and as a result, 
associations […] fail to develop.  The breakdown […] leads to the 
continued maintenance of the episodic memory and its affect in an 
inappropriately strong and affect-laden form.16   
Trauma, that is, has no perspective and no context in which it can be read, felt 
and understood.  Unlike normally processed memories that are ascribed 
meanings and may give rise to meaningful creativity, traumatic events are pre-
meaning and trapped as unprocessed sensory perception—stuck in one time and 
place that can reemerge whole and undiminished in sensory power at anytime 
and place.   
Juliet Mitchell’s argues that because of this difference in processing, PTSD 
has a specific effect on language.    Mitchell writes:  
the trauma sufferer withdraws from reality at the level of her or his own 
language.  But then something reendows this language with energy […] 
That which is spoken is the language of a mimed consensus or a 
compulsive repetition […]; this maybe jargon and plagiarism[…].  Since 
there is not meaning to this language, the notorious lying of the hysteric 
fits in here.  Such language is pseudosymbolic. 17 
What Mitchell describes here as the symptomatic pathology of trauma aligns with 
Friedlander’s aesthetic of limitation and its ‘dilemma’ of representation and is 
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equally useful for understanding the nature of post-traumatic autobiographical 
fiction. As a result of the traumatic event, Mitchell argues, the victim ‘withdraws 
from reality at the level’ of ‘language.’ This withdrawal might thus account for the 
recourse to fiction is taken by many post-trauma writers.  But why must they 
write at all?  As Mitchell suggests, trauma not only distances language from 
reality but also ‘endows’ that language ‘with energy.’ Post-trauma presents its 
victims, she argues, with a vital relationship to language, but a language that 
speaks in riddles and struggles to convey any meaning at all.  Instead, the 
discourse of post-trauma becomes ‘compulsive repetition’ ‘jargon’ and 
‘plagiarism.’ Like autobiographical fiction, that is, this conventional language of 
post-trauma apes familiar forms, yet is unable to attach clear meaning to them—
it is neither one thing nor the other.   
This pseudosymbolic energetic language, I suggest, is precisely what we 
find in the ambiguous troping used compulsively in the works of many writers of 
autobiographical fiction.  Virginia Woolf’s repetitive use of waves, Julia Alvarez’s 
gun stories; JG Ballard’s empty swimming pools; Katherine Mansfield’s windows; 
Jack Kerouac’s angel/brothers; the fictions of each of these repeatedly 
reproduced images with contradictory and unstable meanings.18 Likewise, as 
DeLappe and Simpson argue, the purpose of contemporary counter-monuments 
is to ask questions about agency and representation (‘Who is responsible for 
remembering and mourning, and how can artists respond?’) rather than offer 
answers. 
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Lieux de memoire and Dangerous Speech 
The aim of such different memory projects as post-traumatic fictions and 
contemporary counter-monuments is therefore not truth-telling or remembrance 
in any simple reading of those categories. Both nevertheless attempt to evoke 
what Gilmore calls, in an echo of Foucault’s four questions, ‘the opportunity to 
reflect on how knowledge about truth is produced, by whom and in what 
forms.’19  Works of this kind, visual, oral, and textual, function analogously as 
what Pierre Nora termed ‘lieux dé memoire’ or realms of memory  that generate 
forms knowledge about the relations between truth, memory and memorial.  As 
Nora explains, such ‘lieux- places, sites,’ represent the ‘intent to remember.’  
Moreover, they ‘have no referents in reality; or rather—they are their own 
referents—pure signs.[…] The lieux dé memoire is a templum: […] a circle within 
which everything counts, everything is symbolic, everything is significant.’  Even 
memoirs, Nora argues, can be understood in this way, if ‘beyond simply 
exercising memory, they interrogate it.’20  ‘Lieux dé memoire’  he states, ‘arise 
out of a sense that there is no such thing as a spontaneous memory.’  We need 
them because ’there are no longer any milieu dé memoire, settings in which 
memory is a real part of everyday existence.’21 As Huyssen explains, this anti or 
counter-monumentalism is the result of a post 1945 reaction again ‘monumental 
seduction’ founded in mode of thinking that sees monumentality itself as 
‘unstable as any other aesthetic category.’22  
This instability can be traced in a number of other memory projects in a 
wide range of media:  testimonies in courtrooms and on social networking sites, 
diaries, blogs, documentary films, trauma tweeting and the like attempt to 
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capture and disseminate suffering in the hope of recognition, justice, and 
ultimately, commemoration.23   While each of these forms presents its own 
challenges to defining and circulating ‘truth,’ I argue here that they are 
analogous insofar as each may be read as a lieux dé memoire, and, moreover, a 
lieux that is articulated via the highly charged discourse of what Foucault termed 
‘parrhesia’— a mode of free speech ‘linked to courage in the face of danger.’ 24 In 
such realms of memory not only can witness testimony and video footage 
question a state’s version of events, but the imagination can become a vehicle to 
challenge the very jurisdiction of truth telling. 
Historically, state or community-based artwork has been used to 
memorialize cultural traumas within certain limited parameters of meaning 
(heroism, for example). As DeLappe, Simpson and Huyssen among others note, 
recent years have seen a growing trend towards counter-monuments whose 
message is interrogative rather than didactic: Maya Lin’s Vietnam War Veterans 
Memorial in Washington DC being perhaps the most famous of these.  A parallel 
rise in works of autobiographically-based fictions that draw on traumatic 
experience indicates that this form has likewise become a popular vehicle of 
post-traumatic communication.  
Autobiographical fictions that trouble the boundaries of truth, memory 
and representation, are perhaps the textual spaces that best reflect the long-
term effects of trauma on such communication. As Holocaust historian Annette 
Wieviorka has written ‘[i]t is often supposed that history is better transmitted by 
works of non-fiction [nevertheless] at a time when death is omnipresent, the 
idea arises that the work of art is eternal, that it alone can guarantee memory, 
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that is, immortality.’ 25 Shoshana Felman echoes the necessity for imaginative 
renderings of trauma.  ‘We needed,’ Felman writes, ‘art - the language of infinity- 
to mourn the losses and to face up to what in traumatic memory is not closed 
and cannot be closed.’26 Nevertheless, both the process and the goal of post-
traumatic art, whether literary, visual or otherwise, is dangerous territory 
precisely because of the impossibility of defining and therefore achieving the 
‘immortality’ and ‘infinity’ such work seeks.  
As Huyssen argues ‘[a]ll survivors of traumatic experiences face the 
difficult task of new beginnings. But the tension between traumatic symptom and 
new beginning will necessarily remain unresolved, generating ever new attempts 
at resolution.’27 Post-traumatic autobiographical art whether narrative or 
otherwise is thus generative of knowledge and justice in the context of trauma, 
but is also, in Huyssen’s view, a ‘strategy of avoidance, and delusion of a new 
beginning’ that represents an ‘unattainable horizon of freedom.’ 28 As writers of 
post-trauma autobiographical fictions reach toward that horizon, moreover, they 
encounter the danger of speaking of their experience in the search for justice.  
For Foucault, the ‘parrhesiastic game’ is a condition in which one’s words  
cause one’s life to be ‘exposed’ and in which, ‘you risk death to tell the truth,’ 
‘always in a situation where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority 
with respect to the interlocutor.’29 Might monuments and autobiographical 
fictions be analogous in this context as well? It is easy to see how one might risk 
death by raising a public memorial that challenges the narrative of a state—but 
what possible danger confronts the autobiographical fiction writer? As Felman 
reminds us ‘a work of art cannot sentence to death.’30  But death is not the only 
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danger. And I would argue that just as stone monuments are replaced by virtual 
and endlessly revisable websites of suffering, autobiographical fictions of trauma, 
particularly serial autobiographical fictions (like those by Jamaica Kincaid, JM 
Coetzee, Jack Kerouac, Julia Alvarez and JG Ballard to name a few) can also be 
understood as repetitive lieux dé memoire conducted in parrhesiastic discourse 
whose blurring of genre and fragmented form is symptomatic of the insecurity of 
the terms in which it is spoken and heard. As Huyssen remarks, works that evoke 
a repetitive dialectic between ‘memory and forgetting’ can be read as evidence of 
‘multilayered traumatic experience.’ 31 Likewise the compulsively revisited and 
reimagined tropes that surface in serial autobiographical fictions suggests an 
unwillingness and/or inability to let go of the past.  
Questions about what constitutes truth-telling in such sites are 
compounded by what Leigh Gilmore calls the writer’s ‘potentially disruptive 
performance in that location’ that is ‘freighted with risk’.32 By ‘doing’ trauma 
rather than ‘being’ trauma in such texts, ‘they examine the relations among 
people that exist in the presence of trauma […]in order to conceive of a self who 
can differ from the identity trauma imposes’.33 Thus through the act of speaking 
out, victims become agents. Despite the ‘extra-legal’ forms that not only writers 
of autobiographical fiction but also sculptors, memoirists and architects choose to 
enact such agency,  the public nature of their communication is subject to all 
kinds of pressures.  As Gilmore argues if ‘we insist against all reasonable 
qualification that the law is contaminated, testimony is partial and understanding 
is flawed’, and yet ‘all victims of trauma must nonetheless possess the innocence 
of one who has not yet lived in this messy world’, then we will have ‘brought 
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standards to bear in this jurisdiction that work against an understanding of what 
justice looks like in the context of trauma.’34 While as Felman has shown, ‘a trial 
is presumed to be a search for truth […] technically, it is a search for a decision 
[…] a force of resolution.’ The purpose of the literary text is, on the other hand, 
she notes, to ‘wrench apart what was covered over, closed up or covered up by 
the legal trial.’ 35 Huyssen similarly argues that, ‘the power of the 
commemorative site is to keep the story alive, as opposed to entombing it in the 
realm of the unspoken.’36  This longing to ask questions rather than reach 
decisions is a feature of post-traumatic autobiographical projects in many forms. 
These lieux dé memoire are thus analogous in their intention to trouble 
boundaries and critique the forms of truth and knowledge produced by more 
traditional means. The mode of challenge used by such sites is a rendering of 
traumatic experience in dangerous speech as they reach toward the unattainable 
horizon of freedom. 
Here, I am reminded of Leigh Gilmore’s term for understanding various 
forms of ‘constitutive’ ‘self-representation: ‘Alternative Jurisdictions,’ in which ‘a 
person’s writing and a person’s living contribute […] to different legacies.’ In The 
Limits of Autobiography, Gilmore is particularly interested in the ‘coincidence of 
trauma and self-representation,’ and what it reveals about ‘autobiography, its 
history and especially its limits.’ 37 Recall the representational experiences I 
mentioned earlier: although I did not write my friend’s memoir or the witness 
statement, they are in some sense, autobiographical acts:  I inspired the 
dramatic fictional character and signed off on the portrait of the wounded single 
mom and the stilted language of my witness statement. The self I performed in 
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these different ‘jurisdictions’ collaborated in producing these alternative views of 
me.  But although these acts trouble me, I do not feel endangered by them. 
Something more has to happen for that to occur: the agency invoked by 
representing traumatic experience through parahessiatic discourse. 
Sovereignty and Fiction 
  Telling dangerous truths in works of autobiographical fiction offers what 
Gilmore calls ‘an alternative jurisdiction for self-representation in which writers 
relocate the grounds of judgment, install there a knowing subject rather than a 
sovereign or representative self, and produce an alternative jurisprudence about 
trauma [and] identity.’38  Gilmore’s notion of an extra-legal, ‘alternative 
jurisdiction,’ moreover, might be mapped back onto Nora’s lieux, as sites of 
symbolic significance in which memory is not simply ‘exercised’ but interrogated.  
Central to Gilmore’s formulation is the distinction she draws between ’the 
sovereign self […] the one who can say ‘this is who I am and how I came to be 
this way’ and the ‘knowing self’ of her ‘limit cases’ which does not, ‘ask who am 
I, but how can the relations in which I live […] be reenacted through me.’ 
Autobiographical fiction, she argues ‘presents identity as it develops against the 
grain of sovereignty, the principles of law that underlie it, and the trauma they 
inflict and permit,’ offering a ‘critique of that position and the truth and 
knowledge produced by it.’39 Here, Gilmore posits a ‘knowing’ ‘critiquing self’ 
against a ‘sovereign’ in an either/or relation, but if we conceive of 
autobiographical projects as processes, it may be more useful to understand 
these ‘lieux dé memoire’ as generative sites where the speaking self comes to 
know the instability of the category of sovereignty itself. Rather than a stable ‘I’ 
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that preexists the text, the ‘I’ of post-traumatic autobiographical fiction (like the 
state that commemorates its failure to protect citizens through monumental 
memorials) exposes the limits of supposedly invincible sovereignty.  
In 1922, the political philosopher Carl Schmitt took on the Enlightenment 
view of the sovereign as the supreme lawmaker within his jurisdiction by arguing 
that the sovereign is ‘he who decides on exception.’40 Jacques Derrida developed 
Schmitt’s idea by questioning whether sovereignty is therefore ‘relieved of the 
condition of law? Or else does it exceed or betray it?’ ‘With respect to Schmitt,’ 
Derrida suggests, ‘sovereignty […] [is] a certain power to give, to make, but also 
to suspend the law.’41  
In Derrida’s reflections on ‘Meridian’ by Paul Celan, moreover, he 
examines the dynamic between Celan’s repeated juxtaposition of the words 
‘majesty’ and ‘monarchy’ as it ‘displaces the sense’ of ‘sovereignty’ itself, through 
a ‘hyberbolic’ ‘bidding up’ of power between more/most sovereign. This dynamic, 
for Derrida, points to a insoluble absurdity through which the ‘sovereign’ can be 
that which both creates and exceeds the law, enforces and transgresses 
jurisdictions and has meaning only insofar as that meaning is questioned by one 
which is or claims to be ‘more sovereign.’42  As Derrida argues, one the one hand 
the ‘fundamental axiomatic of responsibility or decision’ is ‘grounded in the 
sovereignty of the subject.’43  On the other hand, by thinking through the 
excesses and contradictions of ‘sovereignty’ one might conceive of a 
deconstructed (and potentially dangerous) figure of the sovereign: a 
differentiated, ‘divided ‘subject’[…] established progressively, laboriously, 
nevertheless imperfectly […] not natural, forever and essentially unstable’.44  
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Gilmore’s ‘knowing subjects’ are thus like Derrida’s ‘divided ‘subject’ who is 
‘established progressively’ and ‘imperfectly’ in the ‘not natural’ site (lieux dé 
memoire) of the autobiographical act.  As the lieux dé memoire of counter-
monuments and post-traumatic autobiographical fiction act-out experience by 
troubling the categories of truth, memory and sovereignty, we find a further link 
among these very different projects: the performativity of trauma. 
The Performance of Trauma 
In Max Saunders’s study on modernist ‘autobiografiction’, he claims that 
‘[w]riting is a kind of performance’ and that in this cross-genre in particular, 
‘writers are consciously and deliberately shifting into the shapes of other 
subjectivities, and thus revealing the performance involved in the achievement of 
any subjectivity.’45 Here, Saunders draws upon a long history of thought in which 
identity is read as a ritualized series of performances.  Judith Butler’s use of 
performativity theory in relation to gender is perhaps the most famous of these 
formulations, and in a Preface to her best selling Gender Trouble, she explains 
that this work built on Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s ‘Before the Law.’46 As Butler 
explains, in Kafka’s parable ‘the one who […] sits before the door of the law, 
attributes a certain force to the law for which one waits. The anticipation of an 
authoritative disclosure of meaning is the means by which that authority is 
attributed and installed: the anticipation conjures the object.’ It is this ‘conjuring’ 
from which Butler’s reading of performativity developed as ‘not a singular act but 
a repetition and ritual.’47  While Butler’s work uses this ritualized performativity to 
interrogate gender, others have reflected on relations between self-knowledge 
and performance in light of autobiography.  
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In 1976, for example, Elizabeth Bruss argued that rather than an act of 
mimesis, autobiography was ‘a personal performance, an action that exemplifies 
the character of the agent responsible for that action’. 48 In ‘Autobiography as 
De-Facement,’  Paul de Man developed the idea of performance as generative, 
arguing that we ‘assume the life produces the autobiography as an act  produces 
its consequences, but […] the autobiographical project may itself produce and 
determine the life.’ 49  Later,  Sidonie Smith and Julie Watson asserted that ‘there 
is no coherent “self” that predates stories about identity, about “who” one is.[…]  
We are always fragmented in time, taking a particular or provisional perspective  
[…] addressing multiple and disparate audiences.  Perhaps, then, it is more 
helpful to approach autobiographical telling as a performative act.’ 50  In this 
‘performative  view of life narratives’ they argue,  ‘identities are not fixed or 
essentialized attributes,’ instead, ‘they are produced and reiterated through 
cultural norms, and thus remain provisional and unstable.’51  
If the intention of such performances is to seek a form of compassion and 
justice, and if, as Emmanuel Levinas has argued ‘[j]ustice is a right to speak,’52 
the seeking, speaking and performative ‘I’ is always revealing the artifice and 
instability at the heart of any exchange between speaker and interlocutor. These 
projects, therefore, will always be marked by instability and multiple aporia 
inherent in ideas of self hood, performance, and of course,  traumatic speech 
itself.  
Genres of Truth 
Does autobiographical fiction tell the truth?  That is often the question 
when autobiographical fiction is in the spotlight. While autobiography was once 
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read as ‘the master narrative of a sovereign self’ 53 this definition has collapsed in 
the face of contemporary challenges to the categories of sovereignty, memory 
and narration. Memoir, on the other hand, historically ‘situated the subject in a 
social environment, as either observer or participant’ and ‘directs attention more 
toward the lives and actions of others than to the narrator.’ 54 But, like 
autobiography, memoir’s defining terms have also been problematized as 
promoting, for example, ‘an “I” that is explicitly constituted in the reports of the 
utterances and proceedings of others.’55 Autobiographical truth, far from 
adhering to a stable set of codes and conventions, is instead ‘an intersubjective 
exchange between narrator and reader, aimed at producing a shared 
understanding of the meaning of a life.’56  As Paul Jay argues, ‘if by ‘fictional’ we 
mean ‘made up’, ‘created’ or ‘imagined’—something, that is, which is literary and 
not ‘real’—then we have merely defined the ontological status of any text, 
autobiographical or not.’ Drawing a distinction between autobiography and 
autobiographical fiction might be, Jay suggests, ‘pointless’.57 Rather than asking 
if autobiographical fiction tells the truth, therefore, we might instead consider 
how far such works function as alternative modes of testimony and disclosure, 
and whether the knowledge and understanding they produce is therefore unique.   
On those terms, the differences between memoirs, traditional imaginative 
fiction and autobiographical fiction can be seen in each form’s distinctive 
relationship to questions not of truth but of the production new forms of 
knowledge.  Memoirs, for example, convey remembered events, dialogue and 
reflections in the narrator’s milieu. Memoirists ask themselves ‘what was it like?’ 
and use their memoirs to answer ‘it was like this.’ Traditional imaginative fiction, 
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on the other hand, produces authority by requiring the writer to control the 
narration of events. The voice of the novel, therefore, is the voice of the author 
asking ‘what if?’ and answering in imaginative prose.   
Autobiographical fiction, however, asks different questions and offers 
different responses, and as it does so has more in common with post-traumatic 
counter-monuments than it does with imaginative fiction and memoir. 
Autobiographical fictions concern the interplay between what the writer knows 
and remembers and what she or he doesn’t and may never know. They are 
therefore produced in the interrogative space between one’s felt life and a once-
potential life now lost to traumatic experience.  This form is a narrative strategy 
for voicing the lacunae of the untold, unsaid, unremembered as well as for 
imagining what never was and never will be. In the case of autobiographical 
fiction that is based on traumatic experience, the interrogative space is also a 
dangerous space, and the untold likely buried for good reason. Like many post-
modern monuments to suffering, autobiographical fiction asks ‘why?’ And 
because both question and response arise from an unstable self that challenges 
the possibility of sovereignty, the answer cannot be ‘it was like this’ or even 
‘what if it was like this?’ but only ever ‘perhaps it was like this.’  ‘Perhaps’ is 
therefore the ambiguous voice of all such interrogative works of fiction and 
memorial art and architecture, and their value comes from this unique 
perspective. In the words of Andreas Huyssen, ‘[o]nce we acknowledge the 
constitutive gap between reality and its representation in language or image we 
must in principle be open to many different possibilities of representing the real 
and its memories […] the semiotic gap cannot be closed by any orthodoxy of 
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correct representation.58  It is this willingness to challenge representational and 
generic orthodoxies that produces vital new forms of understanding of human 
relations in the context of trauma.  
In Cathy Caruth’s work on trauma fiction, she states that in trauma ‘what 
returns to haunt the victim is not only the reality of the violent event’ but also the 
way that violence ‘has not yet been fully known.’ 59 The place of post-traumatic 
autobiographical fiction, therefore, is to ask questions at the locked door within.  
As I noted earlier, however, Juliet Mitchell argues that this is no easy task, for 
‘the trauma sufferer withdraws from reality at the level of her or his own 
language,’ creating a discourse without ‘meaning,’ an ‘imitative or 
pseudosymbolic language.’60  This language calls to mind Pierre Nora’s 
templum— a space within which everything is significant, and also the genre 
blurring that occurs in many autobiographical projects. Max Saunders points to 
this blurring when he argues that the ‘increasing awareness of fictionality 
inhering in the auto/biographic project can be accounted for by the machineries 
of displacement.[…] That is […] a view of the self as constructed in the process 
of expression.’ 61 As Mitchell’s patients withdraw into pseudosymbolic language 
and Saunder’s ‘autobiografictions’ are symptoms of displacements of self-
knowledge, both kinds of narratives are locked in an interrogative relation to the 
past whose mode of expression is the troubling of genre boundaries.  
As Jessica Cantiello has argued, the serial self-representations in Julia 
Alvarez’s autobiographic novels of traumatic experience are particularly 
interesting in this context as the central dilemma of her texts is storytelling itself. 
Alvarez’s work, Cantiello contends, struggles ‘with the opposition between the 
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generative and the destructive aspects’ of writing autobiographical fiction.62 Her 
characters live in two worlds in which words are deadly weapons: the Dominican 
Republic under the brutal dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo and, after they 
immigrate, the USA, where Trujillo’s informers continue to silence the truth. 
Alvarez’s novels are thus burdened with a sense of betrayal in which storytelling 
is the cause of trauma, and yet she is compelled to continue to speak of the 
impact of this trauma in her serial fictional autobiography.  
 Other contemporary fictions test the limits of autobiography in different 
ways. Unlike the semi-confessional mode of Alvarez’s work, the novels of Nobel-
Prize willing author J.M. Cotzee have been read as anti-autobiographical. As 
Thomas Jones has argued, Coetzee’s work plays ‘with the question of why people 
should be at all interested in him as a human being.’63  Coetzee’s fictionalizing, 
that is, doesn’t function in the conventional manner to offer ethical protection to 
the figures whose experience it narrates. Instead, his highly aestheticized 
narratives evade, blur, confound and ultimately critique the relation between 
writer, narrator, subject and reader, positioning a white Afrikaans man against 
the entire tradition of autobiographical confession. In doing so, Coetzee’s novels 
present a strong counter-narrative to the growth of the market for memoir, by 
highlighting the form’s potential for voyeurism, ghoulishness and snobbery.  
In an interview following the publication of the bestseller What is the 
What? (subtitled ‘The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng, A Novel,’ and 
based on events in the life of Deng as told to Eggers) author Dave Eggers side-
steps his blurring of genres in the work. Eggers states that for him the 
distinctions between fiction and literary non-fiction ‘are sort of meaningless… 
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they are fraternal twins.  You can barely tell them apart.’64   If the mode of telling 
is meaningless in Egger’s view—what does matter to him? One answer can be 
found in the series he co-founded entitled Voice of the Witness, which uses oral 
histories to inform readers about struggles for human rights.  For Eggers, 
perhaps, the relationship between speaker and listener may be more important 
than any verification of facts. Indeed, this sense of the communicative power of 
life stories can be found at the end of What is the What, as Valentino says 
‘Whatever I do, however I find a way to live, I will tell these stories […] I speak 
to these people, and I speak to you because I cannot help it.  It gives me 
strength, almost unbelievable strength to know that you are there […] the 
collapsing space between us. […]All the while I will know that you are there.  
How can I pretend that you do not exist?  It would be almost as impossible as 
you pretending that I do not exist.’65  And it is here that we witness the power 
and the limitations of fictive modes of autobiography. For the very presence of 
Eggers as writer/novelist that ‘collapses’ the space between Valentino and his 
listeners, enabling millions of readers to hear the tale of a ‘lost boy,’ also allows 
critics to challenge the ‘truth’ of this second-hand account, and close the door to 
the space Eggers hoped to open.66 
Cathy Caruth argues that the fictive mode of autobiography that has its 
roots in traumatic experience attempts to tell us of a truth that is ‘not otherwise 
available’ and ‘not yet been fully known.’ 67 In Totality and Infinity, however, 
Emmanuel Levinas asks whether truth can ever be separated from knowledge, 
arguing that ‘[t]ruth is in effect, not separable from intelligibility; to know is not 
simply to record, but always to comprehend. We also say that to know is to 
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justify, making intervene […] the notion of justice.’68  Thus Levinas links the 
knowledge of truth to the possibility of justice while Caruth reminds us that a 
condition of trauma is that the truth can never be fully known, and Mitchell 
argues that this is because traumatic experience affects memory at the level of 
language. I am brought back again here to Leigh Gilmore’s idea of alternative 
jurisdictions and the limit cases that test them. Using the example of the debates 
on truth and historic representation that surrounded challenges to the ‘truth’ of 
the Nobel Prize winning testimonio ‘I, Rigoberta Menchú,’69 Gilmore notes the 
process by which ‘the autobiographical politics of the resistant ‘I’ and the ‘we’ 
called to witness’ work together to produce ‘an identity that exceeds its injury’ 
and the ‘experience to offer the materials for transformation.’ 70   
In Gilmore’s account,  certain genre-blurring autobiographical fictions 
‘carve out a jurisdiction in which illegitimate subjects tell stories in forms marked 
out by elements of fiction’.  In the ‘limit cases’ Gilmore examines, I would argue, 
traumatic experience and the desire for justice inscribe a complex relationship 
between the ‘speech of witnesses’, ‘illegitimacy’ and ‘fiction.’ And while these 
texts might not offer ‘truth’ read simply,  they may be understood as producing 
the kind of ‘comphrehension’ called for by Levinas as a requisite of justice, as 
they inhabit what Gilmore calls ‘the conditions in which alternative forms of 
knowledge about justice are compelled to appear.71 Like post-modern 
monuments to suffering, moreover, Gilmore’s ‘limit cases’ may ask questions 
rather than answer them, but they also offer a unique form of knowledge 
production that is collaborative: such forms enable both speaker and listener to 
be in the same place at the same time, hearing the same stories.  As Egger’s 
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Valentino tells us as he speaks in a narrative whose form is itself testing the 
limits of autobiography, ‘I will know that you are there.’ 72  
Contemporary public memorials present us with the names of those we 
have lost.  Why they were lost is another matter, and the ‘perhaps’ of post-
traumatic autobiographical fictions responds to, even if it does not answer, that 
question. For the post-trauma writer, storytelling itself is both the cause and 
symptom of suffering, offered in genre-blurring, pseudo-symbolic, and dangerous 
language.  In this way such works function as textual versions of the unbuilt and 
virtual counter-monuments whose very form speaks to the complexity of 
representing the traumatic past.  
The Narcissistic ’ I’ of Traumatic Memory 
‘Paradise absent is different from paradise lost.’  Dominick LaCapra73 
In 1836, Ralph Waldo Emerson argued that ‘[o]ur age is retrospective. It builds 
the sepulchres of the fathers.’ 74  From his age to our own, perspectives on the 
past and how best to represent it have changed. The memorials we now build 
are more likely to commemorate the suffering inflicted by our forefathers in the 
name of ‘colonization’ or ‘progress’ than the passing of patriarchal heroes. In 
much of the Western world, our age builds memorials to suffering, and the past 
is represented with regret rather than gratitude. Triumphal arches have made 
way for a genre of tribute sacred to the memory of victims of mass violence and 
political persecution. Like the virtual iraqimemorial.org, these counter-
monuments raise questions about the possibility of conveying stable meaning, 
symbolic or otherwise. In Berlin, the Holocaust is remembered by a field of 
concrete slabs; in London, clusters of stainless steel columns honour those lost 
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on July 7th 2005, while the struggle of British suffragettes are represented by a 
huge, floating scroll outside New Scotland Yard; in Montana, ghostly bronze 
warriors on horseback recall the bravery of Native Americans at the Battle of 
Little Bighorn, rewriting the traditional narrative of Custer’s last stand, and in 
lower Manhattan, huge square pits and reflecting pools set in the footprint of the 
World Trade Centre Towers mark the events of September 11th 2001.75 
Perhaps the most well-known of this new age of commemorative tribute 
is the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial in Washington DC, dedicated in 1982. Art 
historian Levi Smith has argued that while the healing of the ‘painful divisions’ 
between the USA and Vietnam ‘has taken place through many vehicles, including 
domestic and international politics […] it is generally agreed that the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial […] has played a central role in helping  Americans to come 
to terms with the past.’   Smith goes on to ask how, ‘despite the lack of any 
general agreement on the war’s meaning, has the memorial managed to be so 
effective?’ 76  One possible answer is that this effectiveness arises precisely from 
the memorial’s resistance to articulating any fixed meaning. In Smith’s view, the 
therapeutic success of the memorial comes ‘first and foremost in its inclusive 
presentation of the names of the dead.  This feature defines the memory of the 
war as that of the Americans that gave their lives in it.’ 77  Like the memorials 
inscribed in post-traumatic autobiographical fiction, that is, its function is not only 
to question how we represent the past and mourn the dead, but also to call 
attention to the absence of what now can never be—the possibility of an 
untraumatised community that is lost forever.  
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Dominick LaCapra has argued for the importance of drawing a distinction 
between ‘absence’ and ‘loss’ to our understanding of post-traumatic effects. As 
LaCapra notes, ‘absence’ as a category ‘does not necessarily imply lack’ because, 
‘one cannot lose what one never had.’ By contrast, LaCapra suggests, ‘loss is 
situated on an historical level and is the consequence of particular events.’ When 
these categories are conflated, he argues, one misrecognises the true nature of 
one’s trauma, because by ‘converting absence into loss, one assumes that there 
was (or at least could be) some original unity, wholeness, security or identity 
which others have […] made us lose.’    To develop this argument, LaCapra notes 
that Freud ‘saw melancholia as characteristic of an arrested process in which the 
depressed, self-berating and traumatized self, locked in compulsive repetition, is 
possessed by the past’ and ‘remains narcissistically identified with the lost 
object.’ ‘Mourning’ for Freud in LaCapra’s reading, however,  ‘brings the 
possibility of engaging trauma’ and achieving ‘cathexis’ allowing ‘one to begin 
again.’ 78 LaCapra further argues that ‘mourning might be seen as a form of 
working-through and melancholia as a form of acting-out.’79  
As I draw to the end of my own argument, I would like consider the 
relationships among these ideas of absence, loss, mourning, melancholia, 
‘working-through’ and ‘acting-out’ as they function in and through post-traumatic 
memory projects. Do such projects, concrete or textual, operate as sites of 
mourning and cathexis, allowing those who produce and engage with them to 
‘begin again’ as LaCapra suggests? Or are they more like melancholic narcissistic 
‘actings-out’ which, through their very repetition, signal a conflation of loss and 
absence and arrested development?  If, that is, a memorial to war veterans 
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enacted a successful process of mourning, would not only one such memorial 
need be built? Likewise, if an autobiographical novel enabled its author to mourn 
a loss, would they need to write another one? Or another thirteen as in the case 
of Jack Kerouac?80  LaCapra’s work suggests that what is being enacted in such 
projects is not (or, not only) a mourning of loss that is worked-through, but (or, 
but also) a melancholia of absence read as loss, acted out again and again.  
While LaCapra argues that ‘absence’ need not imply ‘lack,’ post-traumatic 
memory projects nevertheless often appear to read the absence of what now can 
never be (an untraumatised future) precisely as a loss. Moreover, in the case of 
autobiographical fictions of trauma, the construction of a narrating ‘I’ allows the 
writer to remain melancholically ‘narcissistically identified with the lost object’ by 
acting-out that loss in a narrative performance.  
Levi Smith’s work on the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial suggests that 
alongside the very real opportunity for mourning loss that this site offers, we 
may also see evidence of the melancholy narcissism that is characteristic of post-
traumatic serial autobiographical fictions.  As Smith notes, a striking but 
nevertheless ambiguous aspect of the design is the Wall itself, that ‘points to the 
Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial, referring to both a ‘good’ war, 
the American Revolution, and to a tragic one, the Civil War. […] Its most 
effective and influential ambiguous element, however is the high polish of its 
black granite surface that allows it to appear as a window or as a mirror.’ 81  This 
ambiguity was built in by designer Maya Lin from the start. As Smith points out, 
contestants bidding to design the monument were specifically asked to avoid 
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making ‘any political statement’ or ascribing any meaning to the war in their 
plans.82   
Far removed from the triumphal message of the Air Force memorial or 
the narrative of bravery offered by the Iwo Jimo monument, both nearby, the 
Vietnam memorial’s ‘glittering surface symbolizes the essential indeterminateness 
and ambiguity of memory,’ as Smith argues, and visitors are free to view that 
surface as ‘a window leading to the past, or as a mirror bringing the past to the 
present.’ This absence (and for some its critics, this lack) of clear narrative 
meaning has been the focus of attention, and thus the site has been subject to 
several design interventions, aimed at offering a clearer, more patriotic meaning 
to visitors.83 Such efforts miss the point of Maya Lin’s design, which, as Charles 
Griswold has argued, is ‘fundamentally interrogative.’ 84  This memorial, that is, 
demands of both designer and visitor the kind of ongoing interaction between art 
and life, representation, past and present, fact and memory that I argue is also 
central to post-traumatic autobiographical fiction: like those texts, Lin’s memorial 
allows for a working-through of loss, but also a melancholic acting-out through 
its narcissistic mirroring of objectified suffering. 
The Discourse of Suffering 
Juliet Mitchell’s reading of the pseudosymbolic language of trauma is 
useful for understanding these interrogative forms of memorials and 
autobiographical fiction.  Such symbolically ambiguous templum install the post-
traumatic culture or writer in the position to evoke what Mitchell calls the 
‘unsymbolizable absence’—what could not be seen from the immovable 
perspective inscribed by the traumatic event. By doing so, such projects, 
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narrative or otherwise, allow victims to ‘have access to the play of presence and 
absence.’ 85  As the surface of the Memorial Wall provokes this kind of 
repositioning and serious play between window and mirror, loss and absence, 
self and other, so too do the ghostly warriors of the Little Bighorn Monument and 
the ambiguous stelae, marble scrolls and concrete columns of other memorials to 
the traumatic past.   
As trauma evacuates meaning from experience, the chasm between 
subject and context, in Mitchell’s view, begets a compulsion to create a story 
(however implausible or ambiguous) to fill the gap.  ‘That the story may be 
fiction and the words a lie is because the arbitrary relationship to their referents 
cannot be acknowledged,’ she explains.  Neither fully fact nor fiction, this is the 
hybrid nature of the post-traumatic narrative, in which: ‘[w]ords are 
pseudosymbolic, plagiaristic imitations or metaphors’ that ‘present rather than 
represent’ and what is presented is a repositioned set of sensory experiences 
without context whose meaning is necessarily ambiguous. The reason for this as 
Mitchell argues is that ‘traumatic language is a verbal version of the visual 
language of dreams: words are metaphors, similes, and symbolic equations […] 
expressions of feeling rather than of meaning.86  This discourse of feeling and the 
quest for meaning has compelled post-traumatic writers to repeatedly visit the 
site of their inadequately processed experiences. In these realms of memory they 
offer painful sacrifice to the past in energetic, pseudosymbolic language that 
swerves between fact and fiction, unable, finally, to find a context in which their 
traumatic experiences will have meaning.   
33 
 
The truth that autobiographical fiction tells is the truth of loss and of an 
unsymbolizable, narciscisstically installed absence than must be expressed but 
can only ever be insufficiently articulated by parrahesiatic post-traumatic speech.   
Like this essay, autobiographical fiction stumbles from the dark place of trauma, 
towards the intermittent light that falls between genres, disciplines, and 
memories, searching for a context in which its traumatic experiences might be 
fully understood. The place of such fiction thus exceeds the limits of literature 
and more nearly occupies the lieux dé memoire of post-modern cenotaphs:  
sacred, symbolic but finally empty spaces where we meet to speak and to hear 
the parrhesiatic language of ongoing suffering.  
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